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ABSTRACT 
During the past decade, a primary mission for the United States Navy has 
become Maritime Interception Operations. Many of these operations involve 
shipboard Visit, Board, Search, Seizure teams. These imbedded teams consist of 
motivated sailors who go through a specific training pipeline to become a 
qualified team member. Once these sailors complete the training pipeline, they 
return to their commands and to their normal jobs. Visit, Board, Search, Seizure 
becomes a collateral duty that is often neglected until needed. The author 
conducted a focus group and administered a survey to individuals with Visit, 
Board, Search, Seizure experience to determine where the current capability 
gaps lie. The research found that Visit, Board, Search, Seizure teams are well 
trained, but shipboard manning requirements and Visit, Board, Search, Seizure 
as a collateral duty inhibit the teams ability to maintain proficiency. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The majority of United States Navy Visit, Board, Search, Seizure (VBSS) 
operations are conducted utilizing embedded shipboard teams. To become a 
team member, individuals must meet physical standards, weapons qualifications, 
and attend three courses that total eight weeks. Once qualified, these boarding 
team members can board noncompliant vessels that have a low freeboard. 
This thesis seeks to identify current capabilities gaps in shipboard VBSS, 
specifically in the Human Systems Integration (HSI) domains of Training, 
Manpower, and Safety. To identify potential gaps, seven qualified VBSS team 
members participated in a focus group conducted at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS). Additionally, a survey was fielded to the VBSS team members 
aboard five randomly selected U.S. Navy vessels. 
The research findings indicate that there are potential capabilities gaps 
within shipboard VBSS teams, specifically, in the training and manpower 
domains of HSI. Of the respondents, only 20 percent answered that they train 
more than once a week while underway. When these vessels are inport, the 
participants who train more than once a week decreased to only 5 percent. 
Furthermore, only 5 percent stated that the underway watchbills allow them to 
participate in the majority of their training opportunities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MOTIVATION 
In May 2007, the author reported onboard USS San Antonio (LPD 17) as 
a second tour division officer. During his tour, he was tasked with building the 
onboard Visit, Board, Search, Seizure (VBSS) team from the ground up. VBSS 
teams consist of approximately 21 sailors who are trained in noncompliant 
boarding procedures. It is their mission to board a suspect vessel to verify 
documentation and cargo. During the process of building his ship’s team, the 
author spoke with multiple boarding officers from other vessels to acquire best 
practices from around the fleet. During this process, he realized that there was 
wide variation in VBSS procedures and operations. It appeared that each ship 
had completed a different training pipeline during its qualification process, and 
many of these teams mentioned that they do not conduct routine training. This 
variability and lack of follow-on training was surprising because each team 
member was required to meet the same prerequisites and had attended the 
same schools before joining his or her respective shipboard team. Upon a closer 
inspection, the author became concerned that these teams were not as prepared 
as they should have been, given the dangerous nature of VBSS. 
The prerequisites and training that are required to be a VBSS team 
member are as follows: 
• A good medium or higher in each category of the Physical 
Readiness Test (PRT) 
• Weapons qualification with the M-9 service pistol, M-16 service 
rifle, and 500 mm shotgun. 
• Second class swim qualification completed within the last 12 
months. 
• Completion of a 30-foot Jacob’s ladder climb in full gear. 
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• Completion of the Ships Reaction Force Basic course (including the 
Nonlethal Weapons portion) 
• Completion of the Ships Reaction Force Advanced course 
• Completion of the VBSS Team Trainer course 
Additionally, VBSS boarding officers and breachers must complete additional 
courses/requirements. 
 Although these courses are robust, especially the VBSS Team Trainer 
course and the breacher course, they do not prepare the student for all aspects 
of the Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) mission. Detainee handling, 
compliant boardings, and Approach, Assist, Visits (AAVs) are left for the 
individual commands to focus on and continue to train to. The only time that they 
are addressed before deployment is during the training cycle. During this time, 
there are a few opportunities for the ships to be evaluated while conducting MIO 
missions. The evaluations do a good job at showing a ship where its weaknesses 
are in regards to these missions; however, these evaluations often turn into 
training sessions wherein the boarding team receives further training in correctly 
conducting business during the given scenarios. 
 Once a ship completes the training cycle, there are several factors that 
determine how well prepared a vessel’s VBSS team is during its deployment. 
These factors include command support, underway training, inport training, 
training capabilities, and other missions that the ship is tasked with. Although 
command support and other tasking can greatly affect the amount of training that 
the VBSS team is able to conduct, they are out of the lead boarding officer’s 
control. To ensure that his team is able to safely complete any MIO mission that 
may occur during the deployment, the boarding officer must focus on the quality 
of training that his team receives—both inport and underway. One objective of 
this study was to determine whether a capability gap lies within VBSS training, 
and whether the United States Navy is handicapping the deployed units that are 
in harms way. 
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B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This thesis focuses on the following objectives: 
 Primary Objective: 
• Identify potential capability or readiness gaps in 
shipboard VBSS operations. 
Secondary Objective: 
• Identify potential ways to close the capability (e.g., 
changing manpower requirements, training systems, 
policy changes) 
C. METHODOLOGY 
1. Background Study 
The author started the project by investigating how other services tackled 
the problem of close quarter battle (CQB) training, especially in a deployed 
status. He conducted a literature review that focused on three major topic areas:  
reduced manning effects on team training within the Navy, CQB training 
throughout the world’s military forces, and the historical use of games for training 
and training transfer of simulation-based training. This research provided a solid 
foundation and starting point for the thesis. 
2. Focus Groups 
 The primary purpose of the focus group was to determine whether other 
service members with VBSS experience felt that the current program contained 
capability gaps. Additionally, if the focus group established that there were 




The author developed a survey consisting of 17 questions, tailored 
specifically for the research objectives of this thesis. The purpose of this survey 
was to utilize current VBSS Team Members to identify whether or not there are 
capabilities gaps within VBSS, isolate where the gaps may lie, determine how 
significant the gaps actually are, and identify possible solutions. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The organization of this thesis is as follows: 
I. Introduction: This chapter discusses the motivation behind the author’s 
selection of the topic. Additionally, it provides the objectives and 
methodology of the research. 
II. Literature Review: This chapter provides the background for the thesis 
topic. In this chapter, the author utilizes existing research to show the 
importance of the HSI domains of Training, Manpower, and Safety 
within the VBSS mission set. 
III. Methodology This chapter describes the administration of the focus 
group and survey. 
IV. Results: This chapter discusses the data that was collected from the 
focus group and survey. 
V. Conclusions and Recommendations: The final chapter discusses areas 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When average U.S. citizens think about U.S. Navy warships, they imagine 
large gray vessels that are capable of launching and recovering aircraft at sea, 
shooting down airborne threats, and softening a beach prior to a Marine Corps 
landing. However, since the end of the Cold War, the mission of the U.S. Navy 
has greatly expanded into what is known as MIO. 
MIO was developed to utilize Navy assets to enforce United Nations (UN) 
sanctions on countries that may attempt to smuggle in/out weapons, drugs, and 
people. These missions include querying vessels, boarding vessels, and 
detaining the personnel and vessel when needed. Previously, when a vessel 
needed to be boarded due to contraband or a suspected high-value target on 
board, the U.S. Navy Special Forces were tasked with carrying out the mission. 
However, now that the Navy is trying to take a more proactive stance on illegal 
maritime operations, more vessels are being queried and boarded; the majority 
of which are operating legally. These operations aid the coalition by not only 
showing the terrorists and smugglers that the seas are being patrolled, but they 
also allow our units to build relations with local mariners that may provide 
important information or intelligence on illegal activity in the region. 
With the Navy shifting its focus at sea to MIO, the Special Forces are not 
able to board every vessel of interest. This is largely due to an insufficient 
number of Special Forces units available. Instead, the U.S. Navy expanded 
boarding capabilities to its surface fleet by training highly motivated sailors to 
perform the required tasks. Initially, these boarding teams were poorly equipped 
and lacked proper training for the job, especially if the boarded vessel were to 
become noncompliant (Mullin & Bartee, 2002). Between 2004 and 2005, U.S. 
boarding capabilities took a leap forward with the design and development of the 
Noncompliant VBSS Team Trainer course. This course is the capstone 
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requirement for candidates to become VBSS team members and encompasses 
tactical team movements, hand to hand combat, and combat medical training 
(NTTP 3-07.11). 
B. TRAINING 
Training aids have been, and continue to be, utilized over a wide spectrum 
of professions. Football players use tackling dummies while medical students use 
cadavers, animals, and artificial body parts. The military is no different. Much like 
these other organizations, the military has been constantly evolving techniques 
and technologies to train its personnel. The remainder of this section will focus 
on close quarters combat (CQC). To support VBSS training, or CQC, houses and 
ships have been constructed utilizing shipping containers, plywood, or any other 
available materiel. Some training locations have gone to great lengths to ensure 
that once the trainees enter the facilities, it is as though they are in the live 
environment of a deployed combat zone. Additionally, the training weapons have 
evolved from simple plastic rifles and pistols to military weapons that are 
modified to fire paint bullets from live casings. 
These training aids provide our military with a great advantage in 
knowledge, skills, and mindset. The problem that persists, however, is that these 
advanced training aids are not deployable, can be expensive to 
construct/maintain, or can only be utilized by a small number of personnel at a 
given time. Due to these reasons, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have started 
to look into military training games, coined “serious” games by Ben Sawyer, as 
the new deployable training aid of choice (Macedonia, 2005). 
1. The Military Can Utilize the Civilian Sector 
Over the course of the last two decades, the civilian market has pushed 
the envelope in regards to the development of realistic virtual environments and 
game technology. The advances in realism, efficiency, and usability are largely 
due to the increase in software and hardware technology, which has lowered the 
cost of computers and components while increasing their capabilities. The result 
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of the advancements in hardware and software capabilities is the increased 
quality and authenticity of the developed virtual reality representations. Many 
civilian video game programmers and developers strive to produce the most 
realistic gaming environment that current technology allows. The products of 
these endeavors are video games such as Operation Flashpoint: Cold War 
Crisis, Full Spectrum Warrior, and Call of Duty: Modern Warfare. While the 
civilian sector has been greatly improving their tactical video games, the military 
has attempted to use the technology as a training aid. 
In 1994, id Software released Doom II, a sequel to its landmark 1993 
video game Doom. While this game was winning civilian video game awards, a 
couple of Marines were making military history. These Marines, through 
searching and analyzing multiple civilian video games, had found that id Software 
had released a portion of the game on shareware and allowed gamers to make 
modifications. This capability enabled Sergeant Daniel Snyder to modify the 
skins, or graphics, that were on the players and weapons (Jernigan, 1997). What 
these motivated Marines had accomplished was a video game utilized as a 
military trainer that could be installed on any computer, whether deployed or not 
(Riddell, 1997). Though this game would become popular within the Marine 
Corps for a few years, the technology would quickly advance and leave this 
training aid in the past. 
The latest iteration of the military utilizing the civilian sector’s 
advancements and achievements in gaming technology is with Virtual 
BattleSpace (VBS) 2. As before, the Marine Corps took the initiative, and looked 
for a civilian video game that could be modified to work as a team trainer. Their 
research led to a deal with Bohemia Interactive, an Australian company that 
produced Operation Flashpoint: Cold War Crisis. The finished product was a 
modified version of Operation Flashpoint that allowed the Marine Corps the 
ability to easily edit the gaming environment. This capability allowed the Marine 
Corps to quickly and almost effortlessly create a large number of realistic 
scenarios on various terrains that could be used to train multiple Marines at one 
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time over a network of computers (Brown, 2010). As research continues to be 
conducted by the Marine Corps to verify the effectiveness of “serious” games as 
an effective training aid, the U.S. Army has contracted Bohemia Interactive to 
provide VBS 2 for Army training. 
2. Games Can Benefit the Individual Warfighter 
Creating an environment that allows the individual warfighter to simulate a 
tactical scenario can be difficult. Previously, the Marine Corps has utilized 
sketches and two-dimensional graphics to allow personnel to think through a 
static military situation (Brown, 2010). Though these techniques have worked 
well in the past, they do not utilize the technology that is available today that can 
enhance the learning environment of the trainee. 
The “First Person Shooter” genre of video games allows users to immerse 
themselves in the virtual environment and play the role of their electronic 
character by seeing the “world” from that character’s viewpoint. This approach 
allows for a fast paced, realistic, three-dimensional experience for the user 
(Barlow, Morrison, & Easton, 2002). Another benefit of first person shooter 
games is that they can create realistic enemies, civilians, and friendly forces that 
can add to the user’s experience and allow for a variety of training scenarios. 
Additionally, the software code can be written to allow the administrator to review 
the scenario and how the user performed, further increasing the effectiveness of 
the training. An example is the After Action Review (AAR) feature within VBS 2, 
which allows the scenario to be reviewed from a first person or third person point 
of view (Brown, 2010). 
3. Marksmanship Simulators 
Simulator-based training is another effective method for conducting 
training while saving an organization money. The aviation community is a prime 
example of how successful simulation-based training can be. Pilots can practice 
taking off and landing from any location and with nearly any aircraft platform in 
the world, all while never leaving a small building. The utilization of simulator-
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based training also has proven effective for marksmanship training. For this 
reason, it is widely used across the United States Armed Services. 
The United States Marine Corps prides itself on the slogan “every marine 
is a rifleman.” For this reason, the author researched the use of marksmanship 
simulators in the Marine Corps. More importantly, he examined studies that have 
been conducted to determine the effectiveness of these simulators in comparison 
to live fire training. 
 
Figure 1.   U.S. Marine Using an ISMT Trainer (From U.S. Marine Corps, Public 
Affairs, 2010) 
In 2004, Major William Yates conducted research on the effectiveness of 
training transfer when utilizing the Indoor Simulated Marksmanship Trainer 
(ISMT). He had noticed that the culture within the Marine Corps had shifted to 
rely on virtual environment trainers for both initial skill acquisition and follow-on 
sustainment training. During his study, he conducted an experiment that 
compared the results of a live fire control group against a test group that was 
using the ISMT. The two groups were comprised of new recruits who were 
participating in Marine Corps recruit training. The M16A2 was the weapon utilized 
by both groups during the experiment. The resulting data of Major Yates’ 
experiment did not show a significant difference in performance between the two 
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groups (Yates, 2004). This finding suggests that quality marksmanship trainers, 
like the ISMT, may be a good alternative when live fire weapon training is not 
feasible. 
4. Training Transfer 
Conducting training, regardless of media, is useless if the trainee’s 
performance on the job is not improved. The change in the trainee’s performance 
in the operational environment, or the quality of transfer, is ultimately what 
determines if training is effective or not. For the purposes of this paper, we will 
define training transfer as “the extent of retention and application of knowledge, 
skills, and attitudes from the training environment to the workplace environment” 
(Bossard, Kermarrec, Buche, & Tisseau, 2008). It is not easy to evaluate training 
effectiveness and transfer. 
When evaluating serious games, training transfer can occur on many 
different levels. Within this virtual environment, you have vertical transfer and 
horizontal transfer. Major Ben Brown (2010) stated the following: 
Vertical transfer refers to the ability of the learner to recognize 
elements of the training context and apply what he or she has 
learned to problems of increasing complexity. Horizontal transfer, 
on the other hand, describes the learner’s application of knowledge 
and skills gained through the training to general problems that 
extend beyond the immediate context of what was taught. (p.37) 
To ensure that training transfer occurs, and to increase the quality of the training, 
it is critical that the training remains consistent with the training objectives 
(Bossard et al., 2008). 
Humans are complex and contribute to the challenge of the quality and 
effectiveness of training. Training that is highly effective for one individual may be 
useless for another. To increase the odds that a positive transfer of training 
occurs, the selected media for the training method must match the trainee. 
Matching the media with the trainee can be difficult because people come into 
the training with different experiences. For example, individuals born in the 1960s 
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fix all may not experience as high of a transfer of training when utilizing a serious 
game as the training media, while an individual born in 1990 may greatly benefit 
from this training method. This difference in training transfer could be due to a 
number of reasons. The older individual did not grow up using a computer, while 
the individual born in 1990 was likely to have used one on a daily basis, starting 
in elementary school. In addition, once the individuals sat down to begin their 
training; the older individual may have experienced a higher level of anxiety due 
to not being comfortable with computer media. Trainees can be prescreened to 
minimize these effects and improve the odds that the training method matches 
that of the individuals being trained, though this may not always be possible in 
the military due to the large numbers that have to be trained (Burke & Hutchins, 
2007). 
Once the trainer has selected the most effective method, he must have a 
way to measure, or grade, the trainees’ ability to perform the task and be able to 
review the training session once it is complete. The U.S. Navy’s Conning Officer 
Virtual Environment (COVE) training, given at Surface Warfare Officer School 
(SWOS) in Newport, Rhode Island, is a great example of reviewing the training 
session with the learner. Once the training is complete, the instructor is able to 
show trainees exactly how they performed and what mistakes they made by 
displaying their AARs on the computer screen. Reviewing the trainee’s mistakes 
can increase training transfer (Bossard et al., 2008). 
C. MANPOWER 
According to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2008), or DAG, 
manpower factors are defined as: 
Those job tasks, operation/maintenance rates, associated 
workload, and operational conditions (e.g., risk of hostile fire) that 
are used to determine the number and mix of military and 
Department of Defense (DoD) civilian manpower and contract 
support necessary to operate, maintain, support, and provide 
training for the system. (p. 4) 
 12
In addition, the DAG (2008) states that manpower studies and analysis serve as 
the basis for manpower goals and parameters for systems. The U.S. Navy is 
striving to decrease its manning to the fewest number that are required to 
operate, maintain, train, and support its fleet, also known as “optimal manning” 
(Russell, 2006). This initiative is being driven by a decreasing budget, of which 
the personnel account more than half of the operations and support costs for 
each Navy vessel (Hinkle & Glover, 2004). 
1. Increased Risk with Reduced Manning 
Regardless of the number of personnel that are onboard, the vessel must 
be able to complete its mission(s) while being able to defend itself against 
enemies, fire, and flooding. When in a situation that requires additional 
manpower, a ship will operate in either a Condition I or Condition II watchbill 
status. Condition II is generally for fighting fires or flooding when an enemy 
combatant is not in the vicinity. This watchbill increases the number of personnel 
who are on watch, but places them in damage control stations, allowing the ship 
to fight the fire or flooding for an extended period of time, if need be. Condition I, 
however, is only intended for short durations because it places shipboard 
personnel at all of the damage control and weapon stations to effectively fight the 
ship and any damage that may occur during an enemy attack. With a reduction in 
manpower, the role of each individual onboard is greatly increased. Additionally, 
“optimally” manned vessels may not be able to rely on their increased amount of 
automation due to a loss of power, which could easily be caused by fire or 
flooding (Russell, 2006). 
2. Navy Standard Workweek 
The Navy Standard Workweek is the official guidance that directs the 
number of hours an enlisted sailor should work per week while the ship is 
underway (OPNAV INST 1000.16K). Additionally, the Navy utilizes the standard 
workweek to determine the number of personnel required to man naval vessels. 
The workweek is broken into two categories: Available Time (81 hours allotted) 
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and NonAvailable Time (87 hours allotted), and is based on the expected 
wartime conditions with the unit in Condition III, normal underway steaming. The 
sailors’ available time includes watch standing, maintenance, training, and 
meetings. Currently, the Navy Standard Workweek allots sailors seven hours of 
training a week, but this number will likely increase as manpower is reduced, due 
to an increase in responsibilities and collateral duties of each sailor onboard 
(Haynes, 2007). 
3. Fatigue 
Fatigue, defined as “weariness or exhaustion from labor, exertion, or 
stress” (“Fatigue,” 2007), is becoming a highly researched topic within the 
military, especially in the Navy’s Surface Warfare community. It has been shown 
that fatigue can be brought on by lack of sleep, the time of day/night, inadequate 
nutrition, environmental conditions, as well as many other factors in an 
individual’s daily routine (Chapman, 2001). 
As individuals become fatigued, they are more likely to lose concentration, 
have slower response times, and have poor judgment (Fatigue Management 
Guide, 2005). Fatigue also causes an increase in the number of times individuals 
blink their eyes, the duration of their eye closures, and small bursts of sleep 
known to many as “touch and goes,” but technically titled “microsleep” (Wickens, 
Lee, Liu, & Becker, 2004). These various effects of fatigue are dangerous for 
motor-vehicle operators, but they are common practice for personnel operating a 
warship under the current manning conditions. Even more dangerous is sending 
a team of VBSS members to conduct a boarding on a potentially dangerous 
vessel while they are suffering from fatigue. 
D. SAFETY 
Safety is a key concern for a VBSS team. First, to completely understand 
safety and ensure that everyone is in accord, we must define it. According to 
chapter six of the DAG, “safety factors consist of those system design 
characteristics that serve to minimize the potential for mishaps causing death or 
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injury to operators and maintainers or threaten the survival and/or operation of 
the system” (DAG, 2008). In the case of a VBSS team, the “system” includes all 
of the team members, their equipment, the boat crew, the small boat used for 
transporting the team, and all supporting personnel and equipment onboard the 
ship from which the VBSS team is deployed (including the ship itself). 
1. Previous Incidents 
Going alongside a foreign vessel, whether conducting a full boarding or 
simply an Approach, Assist, Visit (AAV), is inherently dangerous. On 24 April 
2004, USS Firebolt (PC 10) was operating in the Northern Arabian Gulf (NAG) in 
support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Its Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat 
(RHIB) was deployed with the boat crew and four VBSS team members on 
board. When making approaches to fishing dhows that were operating in the 
restricted waters around the Iraqi oil terminals, one vessel abruptly maneuvered 
towards the RHIB and exploded. This explosion killed three of the team members 
and inflicted serious injuries on the remaining survivors in the RHIB (Olson, 
2004). 
USS Gonzalez (DDG 66) experienced a similar, but fortunately not as 
lethal, attack on 18 March 2006 while operating off the coast of Somalia. This 
area is a known “hot spot” for piracy, and Gonzalez and USS Cape St. George 
(CG 71) were working together in the region when they spotted two skiffs in tow 
behind a larger vessel. This configuration is a common indicator of pirate activity, 
so the crew of DDG 66 immediately took action in stepping through their 
procedures for querying and boarding the vessel of interest. As their boarding 
team approached the vessel, the pirates engaged the RHIBs with small-arms fire. 
The RHIBs immediately backed out, while the boarding team returned fire, 
utilizing their small arms. Additionally, both Gonzalez and Cape St. George 
engaged with their respective .50-caliber machine guns. During the engagement, 
the RHIBs with the boarding party were able to safely extract to the nonengaged 
side of Gonzalez. Additionally, rounds fired from Gonzalez ignited a 55-gallon 
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fuel drum aboard the larger pirated vessel, causing explosions and black smoke 
to billow from the vessel. During this short engagement, the U.S. Navy killed one 
Somali pirate and wounded five. In the end, the crews of Gonzalez and Cape St. 
George captured and treated twelve pirates (Department of the Navy–Naval 
Historical Center, 2006). 
In March of 2007, Iran seized a British VBSS team at gunpoint. Leading 
up to this incident, the British team was operating in disputed waters that 
Coalition Forces and Iraq both viewed as Iraqi territorial waters, but Iran claimed 
the waters as theirs. The British team conducted a boarding on a vessel that they 
suspected of smuggling cars. At that time, Iranian ships approached the boat and 
detained the boarding team. The UK claimed that the Iranian ships forcibly 
escorted the boarding team into Iranian waters. Iran held the group of men, 
consisting of eight sailors and seven marines, until they consented to publicly 
stating that they were in the wrong by operating within Iranian territorial waters. 
This incident was similar to one in 2004, when Iran detained eight British 
servicemen for three days (“UK Sailors,” 2007). 
On 31 May 2010, Israel experienced a political debacle due to a botched 
boarding. Unlike the boardings that the U.S. Navy currently performs, Israel 
utilized the boarding as a technique to enforce their blockade. The flotilla was 
stated to be carrying aid to the Gaza strip; however, it refused to adhere to 
Israel’s requirement of entering an Israeli port to be searched for weapons. The 
purpose for the blockade was to ensure that vessels were providing aid to 
civilians, and not support to the Palestinian Islamic organization Hamas, which 
means Islamic Resistance Movement. When the flotilla refused to enter port and 
allow the search to take place, Israel conducted a boarding on the lead vessel, 
Mavi Marmara. Knowing that there were many activists onboard the vessels, 
Israel took precautions by arming the boarding team with nonlethal paintball guns 
for their primary weapons. However, in case they needed live ammunition for 
self-defense, they were still equipped with their secondary weapon. When the 
boarding took place, nearly 500 activists stormed the boarding team members 
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and tried to seize their weapons. This action resulted in a fight that led to the 
death of nine activists. Additionally, seven commandos were injured, two of 
which were serious (Harel, Issacharoff, & Pfeffer, 2010). 
2. Operational Risk Management 
In an attempt to mitigate the dangers, or at least ensure that everyone 
from the Commanding Officer (CO) to the personnel performing the task 
understand the risk involved, the U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations released 
OPNAV Instruction 3500.39B: Operation Risk Management (ORM). This 
instruction provides the policy for all Navy military and civilian personnel, whether 
on duty or off, and it aims to “optimize operational capability and readiness by 
teaching personnel to make sound decisions regardless of the activity in which 
they are involved.” ORM is briefed to the CO prior to any evolution and consists 
of five steps: 
1. Identify Hazards 
2. Assess Hazards 
3. Make Risk Decisions 
4. Implement Controls 
5. Supervise 
Additionally, the brief includes a Risk Assessment Matrix (table 1) which 
graphically depicts what the hazards are, how severe they are, and what the 
probability of a mishap is. Each of these criteria aid in assigning an overall Risk 
Assessment Code (RAC), or an expression which combines each of the 
previously mentioned items into a single number that allows the CO to quickly 
assess the risk involved in conducting the operation. The Hazard severity 
consists of four categories and the Mishap Probability consists of four sub-
categories. These items are defined within OPNAV Instruction 3500.39B as 
follows: 
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1. Hazard Severity – an assessment of the worst credible 
consequence that can occur as a result of a hazard. 
i. Category I – The hazard may cause death, loss of 
facility/asset or result in grave damage to national 
interests. 
ii. Category II – The hazard may cause severe injury, 
illness, property damage, damage to national or 
service interests or degradation to efficient use of 
assets. 
iii. Category III – The hazard may cause minor injury, 
illness, property damage, damage to national, 
service or command interests or degradation to 
efficient use of assets. 
iv. Category IV – The hazard presents a minimal threat 
to personnel safety or health property, national, 
service or command interests, or efficient use of 
assets. 
2. Mishap Probability – The probability that a hazard will result 
in a mishap or loss, based on an assessment of such 
factors as location exposure (cycles or hours of 
operation), affected populations, experience or 
previously established statistical information. 
i. Sub-category A – Likely to occur immediately or 
within a short period. Expected to occur frequently 
to an individual item or person or continuously to a 
fleet, inventory or group. 
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ii. Sub-category B – Probably will occur in time. 
Expected to occur several times to an individual 
item or person or frequently to a fleet, inventory or 
group. 
iii. Sub-category C – May occur in time. Can reasonably 
be expected to occur some time to an individual 
item or person or several times to a fleet, inventory 
or group. 
iv. Sub-category D – Unlikely to occur. 
 
Table 1.   Risk Assessment Matrix 
RISK MATRIX PROBABILITY 
  A B C D 
I 1 1 2 3 
II 1 2 3 4 
III 2 3 4 5 
SEVERITY 
IV 3 4 5 5 
 
E. HOW OTHERS OPERATE 
Often, when looking for a more efficient way of conducting business, one 
can simply start by analyzing similar organizations. In the case of VBSS, the 
United States Coast Guard (USCG) and United States Marine Corps (USMC) are 
two services that conduct the same mission. In recent years, the Marine Corps 
Maritime Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Command (MEUSOC) has been 
the only USMC command that has trained for VBSS missions. There is some 
evidence that in the near future, all sea going Marines will receive VBSS training, 
not just the SOC. However, due to the lack of documentation, this possibility will 
not be discussed further in this document. 
In 1982, the need had arisen for the Department of Defense to address 
the issue of illegal drug trafficking into the United States. In response, the Coast 
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Guard officially established a Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) program 
that would train small detachments of Coast Guard personnel to serve as law 
enforcement specialists. This program expanded in 1986 when Public Law (P.L.) 
99-570 authorized active duty USCG personnel to conduct drug interdiction 
operations from U.S. Navy vessels (U.S. Department of Homeland Security–
United States Coast Guard, 2010). The USCG took another leap forward in 2004 
when they established the Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) Academy at the 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Charleston, South Carolina. In an 
effort to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the USCG personnel 
conducting maritime law enforcement, the MLE Academy offers five training 
programs (U.S. Department of Homeland Security–Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center, 2010). 
1. Boarding Officer Qualification Support Program (BOQSP) 
 The Coast Guard developed the BOQSP course to provide USCG 
personnel with a foundation of the fundamental tools required to facilitate law 
enforcement. The course lasts 11 days and covers the following curricula: 
• Authority and jurisdiction 
• Use of force 
• Tactical procedures 
• Criminal law 
• Defensive tactics 
• Arrest procedures 
• MLE boarding procedures 
• Personal Watercraft (PWC) boarding procedures 
• Boating safety regulations 
• Commercial fishing Industry regulations 




The BOQSP program consists of two sections, a self-paced e-Learning 
course and a residential practical course that focuses on maritime boarding 
procedures and shore-side operations. Each section of the program has a 
different set of prerequisites, which are as follows: 
e-Learning course 
• Selected Reserve (SELRES) member at a unit conducting law 
enforcement (LE) operations 
• Either civilian LE experience or currently completing the LE 
Boarding Officer/Boarding Team Member Personnel 
Qualification Standards (PQS) program (or specifically 
recommended by parent command as a high potential for 
success in the program) 
• Must be Boarding Team Member (BTM) qualified 
• Unit has capacity to support qualification process: PQS reviews 
and certification (practical evaluation/boarding experience) 
• Unit willing to dedicate individual’s Inactive Duty for Training 
(IDT) periods to e-Learning program and On-the-Job Training 
(OJT) certification 
• Will meet physical fitness criteria as set forth in the MLE PQS 
before attending the residential Boarding Officer Practical 
Course (BOPC) 
• Will meet weapons criteria as set forth in the MLEPQS before 
attending the BOPC 
• Ranks E-4 and above 
• Available and willing to serve Active Duty for Training (ADT) 
during one of the 2-week BOPC courses 
• Committed to completing program syllabus, including dedicating 
IDT/ADT time to the program 
• Recommended by command and command is prepared to meet 
additional unit support requirements 
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• Mobilizing to a LE Contingency Personnel Requirements Lists 
(CPRL) billet 
BOPC residential course 
• Member possesses, in the opinion of the Commanding Officer 
(CO)/Officer in Charge (OIC), the requisite judgment, maturity, 
attitude, and aptitude to serve as a Boarding Officer 
• Member has satisfactorily completed Task1-01 (annual physical 
fitness standards) of the Boarding Officer/Boarding Officer 
Team Member PQS, COMDTINST M16247.3 (series) 
• Member has satisfactorily completed Task 1-02 (semi-annual M-
9 weapons qualifications including the Judgmental Pistol 
Course) of the Boarding Officer/Boarding Officer Team 
• Member has completed required PQS, COMDTINST M16247.3 
(series) 
• Member is within maximum allowable weight in accordance with 
Allowable Weight Standards for Coast Guard Military Personnel, 
COMDTINST M1020.8 (series) 
• Members must have completed the Boarding Officer Web-
Based Training prior to arrival at MLEA 
2. Marine Patrol Officer Course–Tactical (MPOC-T) 
 The MPOC-T course is a two-week program designed specifically for 
Federal, State, and Local Marine Patrol Officers who will conduct operations 
alongside the USCG. Trainees receive the following instruction: 
• Boarding procedures (including mock boardings) 
• Vessel papers, hull identification numbers, federal 
documentation and licensing 
• Federal boating safety carriage requirements 
• Radiation pagers, meth labs, hazardous situations, and confined 
spaces 
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• USCG use of force policy 
• Hand cuffing 
• Pressure points 
• Tactical procedures 
• Basic navigation 
• USCG vessel on vessel use of force 
• Less than lethal technologies 
• Security zone enforcement 
• Search and rescue execution 
• Boating under the influence (BUI) 
• Federal firearms law, identification, documentation 
• Advanced water survival techniques, performance scenarios 
• Marine theft investigation 
• Boating accident investigation 
This course relates to the Navy’s mission to train ally nations in proper 
boarding procedures. The purpose of providing this training is to increase the 
number of personnel conducting these missions, therefore, also increasing the 
ability to patrol a greater amount of territory. 
3. U.S. Coast Guard Basic Boarding Officer Course (BOC) 
 BOC is a 28-day course offered to both USCG personnel and foreign 
naval officers. The purpose of this course is to prepare the trainees to perform 
the arduous duties required of a Boarding Officer. The curriculum includes: 
• Authority and jurisdiction 
• Use of force 
• Tactical procedures 
• Criminal law 
• Constitutional law 
• Defensive tactics 
• Arrest procedures 
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• MLE boarding procedures 
• PWCS boarding procedures 
• Confined spaces 
• Boating safety regulations 
• Commercial fishing industry regulations 
• BUI enforcement 
• Testify in court 
• Hostage situations 
• Fraudulent documents 
Although this course is offered to foreign naval officers and USCG 
personnel, prerequisites only exist for the USCG personnel. These requirements 
are as follows: 
• Member possesses, in the opinion of the CO/OIC, the requisite 
judgment, maturity, attitude, and aptitude to serve as a Boarding 
Officer. 
• Member has satisfactorily completed an annual physical fitness 
test for the Boarding Officer/Boarding Team Member PQS. 
• Member has satisfactorily completed the semi-annual M-9 
weapons qualifications, including the judgmental pistol course. 
• Member is within maximum allowable weight in accordance with 
Allowable Weight Standards for USCG Military Personnel, 
COMDTINST M1020.8 (series). 
• Member must have either eighteen months remaining at current 
unit or have orders to a unit with specific law enforcement 
responsibility. They must also be conducting boardings within 3 
months of graduation. 
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4. U.S. Coast Guard Boarding Team Member Course (BTM) 
 This nine-day course trains graduates to operate as a boarding team 
member under the supervision of a Boarding Officer. The course curriculum 
includes the following: 
• Authority and jurisdiction 
• Use of force 
• Defensive tactics 
• Arrest procedures 
• Boarding procedures 
• Tactical procedures 
• Hostage situations 
• Statement writing 
There are no prerequisites for attending this course unless the trainee is 
also going to attend BOC, in which case, it is required to meet the BOC 
prerequisites before attending the BTM course. 
5. U.S. Coast Guard Radiation Detection Level II Operators 
Course (RADHAZ) 
 The purpose of this course is to prepare graduates to conduct shipboard 
and ashore radiation detection operations. The program stresses “hands-on” 
practical experience to teach applicable concepts in radiological science and 
safety. Due to the nature of this course, teamwork, effectiveness, officer safety, 
and practical exercises are greatly emphasized. This three-day course includes 
the following curricula: 
• Radiation concepts 
• Introduction to radiological and nuclear weapons 
• Introduction to boardings and level II radiation detection 
techniques 
• RadPager (Personal Radiation Detector/PRD) Review 
• Introduction to RadPack (Radiation Detection Backpack) 
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• Introduction to Identifinder (Radioisotope Identification 
Device/RIID) 
• Policy and procedures: downloading spectra and reach-back 
operations 
The following prerequisites apply to this course: 
• Must be E-4 or above 
• Members must have at least one year remaining at their unit or 
be transferring to a unit that conducts radiation detection. 
• Individuals who will operate Level II RAD detection equipment 
are required to complete follow on Level I RAD training. 
In summary, the U.S. Coast Guard has created an effective training 
pipeline, that is both in depth and highly specialized, for the specific job that the 
trainee will be qualified to conduct upon completion. These courses cover more 
information than the current U.S. Navy VBSS Team Trainer course that all 
boarding team members are required to complete. Additionally, the U.S. Navy 
Boarding Officer course is only five days, compared to the U.S. Coast Guard 
Boarding Officer course that is 28 days. 
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III. METHODS 
Upon selecting his thesis topic, the author conducted a literature review to 
find information that had already been published on the topic of capability gaps 
within shipboard VBSS. The literature review did not uncover any research that 
had already been completed to address this topic specifically; therefore, the 
author began to search for a reasonable approach to obtain the data. Ideally, the 
research would have been conducted by visiting multiple ships at each homeport 
and overseas. Once aboard the vessels, the author would have conducted a 
survey, observed a training session, and reviewed records of prior training 
sessions and actual missions completed. 
However, due to time and funding limitations, the author wanted to obtain 
accurate data without traveling to multiple commands. For this reason, a focus 
group was selected to determine the quality of the topic, and a survey was 
drafted to obtain the data. Each of these methods is beneficial for collecting data, 
saving time, and saving money because they can both be conducted without 
leaving the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) campus. It is important to note 
that individuals may have participated strictly because they felt strongly about the 
subject, whether it be good or bad, which could potentially skew the data. After 
evaluating the advantages and disadvantages to these methods, the author 
decided to continue with the focus group and survey for collecting the data. 
A. FOCUS GROUP ADMINISTRATION 
As with any study, the individual conducting the research believes that 
their topic, or idea, is important. For this reason, the author conducted a focus 
group to verify the validity of the perceived issues. To be effective, the author had 
to be careful not to inject his ideas or beliefs into the focus group discussion. 
Doing so would compromise the validity of the focus group and the research to 
follow. Additionally, though it did not appear to be an issue, the author had to be 
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aware of “groupthink,” which has been identified by Janis Irving (1972) as “faulty 
decision-making within a group due to the desire for unanimity at the expense of 
quality.” 
Obtaining qualified participants was easy, thanks to the great support 
offered from other students at NPS. An electronic mail (Appendix A) was sent to 
all Surface Warfare Officers currently stationed at NPS requesting the 
participation of those who had VBSS experience. The target number of 
participants was five to ten, and within twenty minutes of transmitting the 
electronic mail, ten individuals had volunteered to participate. Of the ten 
volunteers, seven qualified Officers participated in the focus group. 
The focus group was conducted in the Human Systems Integration 
Laboratory (HSIL), located on the NPS campus in Monterey, California. Upon 
arrival, each participant signed an informed consent form (Appendix B). The 
author then opened the focus group by asking the participants to discuss their 
opinion towards the effectiveness of how VBSS is currently set up. The open 
dialogue lasted seventeen minutes and the author did not need to interject. The 
focus group was digitally recorded, with the participants consent, to allow for 
more accurate data analysis. 
B. SURVEY ADMINISTRATION 
Strict attention was paid to the wording of each question when developing 
the survey. It needed to accomplish the objectives that the research was seeking 
in as few questions as possible. Otherwise, the participants would lose interest 
and either skip the remaining questions or provide inaccurate responses. 
Additionally, the authors view point and beliefs could not be transparent or it 
would likely influence the results. 
Once the author developed the questions that he felt were appropriate, he 
had four individuals with survey experience critique them. The final product 
started with an informed consent form (Appendix C) that the participants agreed 
to before continuing with the survey. The survey itself consisted of 17 questions 
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(Appendix D) that met the objectives of the research. The informed consent form 
and the questions were then placed into Survey Monkey, the desired instrument 
for fielding the survey. 
To obtain participants for the survey, the author drafted a letter (Appendix 
E) that stated the purpose of the anonymous survey, and electronically mailed it 
to the Commanding Officers of 10 randomly selected U.S. Navy vessels. To 
choose the vessels, the author blocked them by homeport and ship class and 
then chose randomly as follows: three vessels from Naval Station Norfolk, three 
vessels from Naval Station San Diego, two vessels from Naval Station Mayport, 
and two vessels from Naval Station Pearl Harbor. The breakdown of ship classes 
were as follows: two guided missile cruisers (CG), two guided missile destroyers 
(DDG), two frigates (FFG), two amphibious dock landing ships (LSD), and two 
amphibious transport docks (LPD). Additionally, one of the LPDs was of the old 
Austin class and one was of the new San Antonio class. 
Out of the ten randomly selected vessels, five Commanding Officers 
granted approval for utilizing their crew for the research. These five vessels were 
distributed across all four of the homeports and covered all of the ship classes; 
with the exception of the Austin class LPD. With approximately 21 qualified team 
members per vessel, there was a potential 105 respondents. The author fielded 
the survey to the five ships by sending an email to the boarding team members 
requesting their participation (Appendix F). 
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A. FOCUS GROUP ANALYSIS 
The results from the focus group divided into three topical areas: materiel 
issues, manpower/personnel issues, and training issues. 
1. Materiel Issues 
Though “materiel” is not directly an HSI domain, it does play a large roll in 
the human factors and safety domains. The focus group indicated that there is a 
materiel discrepancy with the current small boats that are being utilized for 
transporting the VBSS teams to the vessel of interest. 
Often, when a U.S. Navy asset is conducting VBSS or AAV operations, 
their team deploys for the better part of the day. This time requirement usually 
means that the team spends a large amount of that time in the RHIB. Since these 
RHIBs are not necessarily designed for long-term use by a team of six or more, 
the team will not have seats that are designed to absorb the impact from the 
waves. This can greatly affect the fatigue level of the sailors, both mentally and 
physically (Peterson & Bass, 2005). 
The focus group also identified a maintenance issue. In the experience of 
the boarding officers in the focus group, their RHIBs required many maintenance 
hours to keep them operational. There may be a training issue for the individuals 
that are operating and/or conducting the maintenance on these small boats. One 
of the focus group participants mentioned that he recently participated in a North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) deployment where they conducted 
exercises with multiple European nations. Many of the exercises were VBSS 
exercises where he was able to work with the various nations VBSS teams. 
According to this participant, the majority if not all, of the nations were better 
equipped and had better RHIBs than the U.S. boarding teams. More research will 
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be needed to confirm the allegations of the focus group that a capabilities gap 
exists with respect to materiel, namely the RHIBs used for VBSS. 
2. Manpower/Personnel Issues 
Manpower and personnel were not large topics of discussion in the focus 
group, but the participants did feel strongly about the issue when comments were 
made. They all felt that to effectively operate the way that the VBSS program is 
currently set up, U.S. vessels need to not only increase the number of people 
(manpower) on board, but they must acquire the right people (personnel). These 
opinions confirmed the author’s initial thoughts to include the effects of manning 
levels on the VBSS teams in the survey. 
3. Training Issues 
The participants spent the majority of the time discussing training issues. 
As expected, they all believed that the Navy’s push towards optimally manned 
ships has had a negative effect on the VBSS teams. The decrease in sailors 
onboard the ships has created a “manpower drain,” which is not only having a 
negative impact on the MIO mission set, but on every mission set that the ships 
are currently involved in. 
The participant who completed the NATO deployment also emphasized 
training. Not only did he report that these other nations teams were better 
equipped, but when he talked to their boarding officers, he found that VBSS was 
not a collateral duty for them as it is in the U.S. They were onboard to perform 
the VBSS mission set and only the VBSS mission set. This focus allowed their 
teams to train and build strong team cohesiveness before, and throughout, a 
deployment. For this reason, his observations led him to the belief that the U.S. 
VBSS teams were the least prepared when compared to the European nations 
that have a strong VBSS program. 
The current VBSS team trainer course also was discussed in depth. All of 
the participants agreed that the course does an outstanding job in preparing the 
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sailors for noncompliant boardings, but it fails in many other areas. In particular, 
when sailors graduate from this course, they do not have an understanding of 
how to start a compliant boarding and ramp up to a noncomplaint boarding, if 
necessary. These sailors treat every boarding as though it is noncompliant and 
can easily deter local fisherman and mariners from sharing information. A 
noncompliant approach not only has a negative effect on information gathering 
capabilities, but it also has a negative effect on how mariners view the U.S. This 
method of conducting boardings goes hand in hand with AAVs. The schoolhouse 
does not train sailors in how to conduct the AAV mission set. The VBSS teams 
are left to “figure it out” on the fly, usually in theater. Again, the sailors approach, 
if done incorrectly, has a negative impact on the local fisherman. Instead of 
building relations with these fishermen, we tend to scare them. It was briefly 
mentioned that translators are a great asset when conducting AAVs, but ships 
often deploy without one. 
The training pipeline that our sailors go through also fails to address 
detainee handling. Handling detainees is never covered in the schoolhouse, and 
is often over looked in the pre-deployment training cycle. When a mock boarding 
requires the VBSS team to take detainees, the training environment is stopped 
and the transportation and detention of the detainees is simulated. Detainee 
handling should be addressed because it not only affects the shipboard VBSS 
teams, but it affects the entire ship supporting the VBSS team. When taking 
detainees, considerable attention is given to provide a habitable location for them 
to be held where food, water, medical care, showers, etc. can easily be provided. 
These requirements are important in today’s Navy due to the likelihood of 
housing detainees, but they add additional stress to the crew of the ships. 
B. SURVEY ANALYSIS 
The results from the survey indicated that 45 individuals participated 
(evenly distributed across four of the ships with only one respondent from the fifth 
ship); however, one of the participants skipped every question. Therefore, the 
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results are based on 44 respondents. The denominator was calculated from five 
ships receiving the survey, each with an Allowable Equipment List (AEL) for 21 
VBSS team members, making 105 potential recipients and an overall response 
rate of 41.9%. Of the 44 respondents, the answers to the survey were consistent 
across the platforms. Additionally, it is important to mention that one participant 
happened to be an embarked member from a Navy Expeditionary Intelligence 
Command (NEIC) unit. This individuals responses to the survey were still 
included even though VBSS is his/her primary job and that he/she would have 
received a greater amount of continuous training prior to embarking the ship that 
was surveyed. 
To analyze the results, the author divided the questions into three 
categories: Manning, Training, and Deployment. Although manning can greatly 
affect the ability to train, these categories were the best fit for the data and in 
attempting to identify a capabilities gap. 
1. Manning 
Of the 44 individuals that participated in the survey, 66% (29) of them 
responded that their ships manning levels currently have an effect on VBSS. The 
follow on questions broke down whether this was a positive or negative effect for 
both training and actual operations. As shown in Table 2, these results indicate 
that current manning levels have a negative impact on VBSS training, regardless 
of the ship. 
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Table 2.   Question 2 Results 
 
Table 3.   Question 3 Results 
What impact did manning have on actual VBSS operations? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Negative affect 45.2% 14 
No affect 48.4% 15 




When it comes to actual operations, the current manning levels still have a 
negative impact in the opinion of 45% of the sailors that were surveyed (Table 3). 
This result could be looked at in two different ways. First, the majority of the 
individuals that replied with “negative affect” to actual VBSS operations may have 
been on the same ship(s). If this were the case, then it can be assumed that at 
least two of the five surveyed vessels (45% of the respondents divided by the five 
vessels that were surveyed) are affected by current manning levels during actual 
operations. Second, this result could simply indicate a trend among individuals 
within certain departments. If the later is true, the Navy has a large portion of 
sailors on every ship whom manning levels negatively affect during actual 
operations. If not addressed, both of these likely outcomes pose a problem for 
the Navy. 
What was the impact that manning had on VBSS training opportunities? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Negative affect 87.1% 27 
No affect 6.5% 2 




 Manpower has a direct impact on a ship’s watchbills. If a vessel has the 
right number of sailors, then they will be able to create watchbills that allow the 
ship to effectively and efficiently operate in support of each mission set, to 
include training. However, if there are not enough sailors, then personnel will 
often have to miss training exercises because the watchbills cannot be flexible. 
These manning conditions also have an impact on the fatigue level of the sailors 
because they will often be standing more watch, and working longer hours, to 
make up for the lack of personnel. Tables 4–6 indicate that the majority of the 
Navy’s VBSS sailors are able to participate in actual operations, but watchbills 
are not flexible enough to allow them to participate in training on a regular basis 
(only 5.1% are able to). Additionally, nearly half of the sailors are not able to get 
at least six hours of sleep before actual VBSS operations. Fatigue can have a 
crucial impact on the sailors’ ability to function and operate as needed, not only 
during a boarding, but also in their day-to-day routine. 
Table 4.   Question 8 Results 
Are the underway watchbills set up to allow you to participate in training on a 
regular basis? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
No 46.2% 18 
Sometimes 48.7% 19 




Table 5.   Question 9 Results 
Are the underway watchbills set up to allow you to participate in actual operations 
on a regular basis? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
No 17.9% 7 
Sometimes 51.3% 20 




Table 6.   Question 10 Results 
On average, does your command give you an opportunity to get at least 6 hours of 
sleep prior to actual VBSS operations? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes 48.7% 19 





When looking at VBSS training, physical fitness must be included. 
Although fitness does not necessarily improve the team’s ability to clear a room 
more efficiently, it does contribute to building team camaraderie. Question 4 
asked, “does your VBSS team PT together?” Of the 40 respondents that 
answered this question, 34 (85%) answered no, they don’t PT together whether 
they are in port or underway. Based on that datum point alone, it would not be 
expected that these teams would frequently train together on actual VBSS skill 
sets. For the most part, this would be corroborated by the responses to the 
following questions. 
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Table 7.   Question 5 Results 
How often does your ship’s VBSS team train while in port (not including PT)? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Less than once a Week 82.5% 33 
Once a Week 12.5% 5 
Twice a Week 0.0% 0 
More than Twice a Week 5.0% 2 
answered question 40
skipped question 5
Table 8.   Question 6 Results 
How often does your ships’ VBSS team train while underway (not including PT)? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Less than once a Week 37.5% 15 
Once a Week 42.5% 17 
Twice a Week 20.0% 8 
More than Twice a Week 0.0% 0 
answered question 40
skipped question 5
Table 9.   Question 7 Results 
Does the amount of training differ between the work up cycle and actual 
deployment? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
No, we train the same 12.5% 5 
We train more often during work-ups 45.0% 18 





Table 10.   Question 13 Results 













Boardings 0 3 17 4 24 
Approach, Assist, Visits 
(AAVs) 2 3 12 7 24 




Tables 7–9 show that current shipboard VBSS teams are not training often 
enough to stay proficient. This insufficient training is likely a result of VBSS being 
a collateral duty and the ships being tasked with many other demanding mission 
sets requiring the sailors’ time. Table 10 on the other hand, indicates that these 
sailors often feel as though they are either fairly well prepared or very well 
prepared for the different MIO mission sets. This belief needs to be evaluated 
further to determine whether shipboard sailors are truly prepared for each of 
these MIO missions, or if it is simply a false sense of security resulting from 
completing the VBSS Team Trainer course. 
3. Deployment 
To determine the experience level of the VBSS Team Members that 
responded to the survey, two questions were included pertaining to deployments. 
The first question asked if the individual has made a deployment as part of their 
ship’s VBSS team. Of the 38 respondents who answered this question, 30 
(78.9%) had made at least one deployment and were then directed to the second 
question, which can be seen in Table 11. These results indicate that the majority 
of the individuals who responded to this survey had some experience in actual 
MIO missions. These experiences may have skewed the responses in table 10 
due to the individuals learning, and adapting, throughout the course of their 
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deployment. Further research needs to be conducted to determine how safe and 
efficient current VBSS teams operate, and how that pairs to these individuals’ 
opinions regarding their preparedness. 
Table 11.   Question 12 Results 
During your last deployment, in how many months did your VBSS team conduct 
actual operations? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
0 20.0% 6 
1-2 36.7% 11 





The analysis of the survey indicates that capabilities gaps exist with 
manpower and training. These findings are more evident in the open-ended 
answers to question sixteen, where twenty respondents provided feedback. Of 
these responses, thirteen mentioned that training was inadequate onboard the 
ships, nine mentioned that manning created a burden for the teams, and one 
individual was not happy with the current materiel that VBSS teams are issued. It 
is important to note that two individuals recommended that VBSS become its 
own rate, where the individuals embark a ship for deployment. In particular, 
respondent number thirteen stated (Appendix G): 
I also feel that VBSS should be a primary duty, or rate and not a 
collateral duty. To pull sailors that primarily deal with maintaining 
extremely expensive combat systems and engineering equipment, 
and then ask them to instantly switch mindsets to go board a 
suspect vessel is near reckless. This practice yields sailors that are 
mediocre technicians and mediocre boarding team members, and 
puts lives at risk on the RHIB, on the vessel, and the ship. 
Although future research would need to be conducted in regards to the 
effectiveness of “switching mindsets,” this respondent has valid concerns. 
Additionally, many of the comments criticized the current operational tempo 
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(OPTEMPO) that the Navy maintains while both inport and underway due to the 
negative effect that it has on shipboard training, not just VBSS training (Appendix 
G). 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The results from the focus group and the survey support the hypothesis 
that potential capabilities gaps exist within U.S. Navy Shipboard VBSS teams. 
Furthermore, the data indicates the capabilities gaps fall mainly within the HSI 
domains of training and manpower. VBSS as a collateral duty, and the Navy’s 
push towards an optimally manned fleet, have led to a current manning deficit, 
which does not allow the opportunity for ships to effectively train their embedded 
VBSS teams. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings, the author recommends increasing VBSS efficiency 
through the following methods. 
1. Embarked Units 
The U.S. Navy currently utilizes embarked units for warfare areas that 
require specialized training. As mentioned earlier, two of the respondents left 
feedback that recommended this approach be utilized for VBSS as well. A great 
example of embarked units in current operation is the Navy Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) teams. These units often embark and deploy with Carrier Strike 
Groups (CSG). Additionally, mine countermeasure ships (MCM) often embark an 
EOD detachment before conducting an exercise or live operation where their 
expertise may be needed. Another key example of a unit that will embark a ship 
when needed is an Information Exploitation Team (IET). These small teams, 
often 1 to 3 members, will embark a vessel when their assistance is needed in 
gaining tactically viable information. 
Since creating the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), the 
Navy also has stood up a small number of Helicopter-borne VBSS (HVBSS) 
teams. These units go through the same training pipeline as the standard 
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shipboard VBSS units, but they receive additional training to be able to deploy 
via fast rope from a helicopter. This HVBSS capability brings a lot to the table 
when planning for a mission because the ship’s freeboard height is no longer an 
issue for conducting the boarding when helicopter assets are available. 
My recommendation would be to utilize these HVBSS units as the primary 
means of conducting VBSS operations. These units would still utilize the ships 
RHIBs for the majority of their boardings. However, when a high freeboard 
boarding is required and a helicopter asset is available, the ship would already 
have a qualified boarding team onboard. Having an embarked HVBSS team will 
save the Navy much needed time between acquiring the vessel of interest and 
having a boarding team onboard the contact. Disbanding the shipboard VBSS 
teams and moving to a strictly embarked unit also would benefit the Navy in other 
ways. The efficiency of our Navy ships would increase by removing a major 
collateral duty from their personnel. These individuals would not have to balance 
VBSS training with their primary duties onboard. Almost any sailor will tell you 
that they do not have enough time in the day to accomplish all of their required 
tasks (Haynes, 2007). 
The HVBSS units would be able to train together every day, as opposed to 
once a week with the shipboard teams, since it would be their primary duty. This 
increased training time, as well as the fast rope capability that they offer, would 
greatly increase the efficiency of boardings and AAVs. Additionally, the HVBSS 
units can easily incorporate Intelligence Exploitation Team (IET) members that 
are trained in tactical questioning, which if needed, allows them to obtain greater 
information than the current shipboard VBSS teams. 
Once a strike group begins the workup cycle, these HVBSS units would 
embark each ship within that strike group. VBSS training is already included in 
the workup cycle, therefore, there would not be any additional burden required by 
the ships for conducting training with these embarked units. The limiting factor 
would be space. These embarked units would require berthing, which falls short 
on many ships, but it could be feasible. The space required for their gear would 
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not be as much of an issue since the ships would no longer have to maintain 
their own VBSS Authorized Equipment List (AEL). 
To allow these HVBSS units to provide an even larger asset to the ships 
they embark, their mission set, and to the Navy as a whole, it would be beneficial 
to include language training for at least three of the individuals on the team (one 
per seven-man squad). These three individuals could each be trained in a 
different language for the target region that the ships will be deploying to. The 
added language capability would increase the effectiveness of querying vessels 
prior to conducting boardings, gaining viable information from the crew while 
conducting the boardings, and would greatly aid in gaining a good relationship 
with the local merchant traffic. All of these recommendations would contribute to 
the Navy’s effectiveness in conducting MIO. 
2. Deployable Mission Trainer 
Initially, the author was intrigued by the VBS 2 serious game that the 
Marine Corps and Army have begun to incorporate into their training regimen. If 
this system works for them, why can the Navy not make it work for VBSS 
training? Ideally, a training system like VBS 2 would allow the team to train 
around their ship’s schedule. If the entire team cannot make a training session, 
which is currently common practice based on the author’s data, as little as one 
individual can log into the serious game and conduct some level of training. This 
opportunity would maximize training while minimizing cost and space, which are 
both extremely important on a ship. Though serious games may work, and future 
research could support it as a viable option, the surface warfare community may 
not be as accepting of it. 
However, an Indoor Simulated Marksmanship Trainer-Enhanced (ISMT-E) 
can provide efficient weapons training while underway. The ISMT-E is a proven 
system through the Marine Corps and is already available on some of the fleets 
Amphibious ships. This option would not solve all of the training issues, but 
would provide an opportunity for the ship to routinely rotate VBSS, ship’s reaction 
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force (SRF), and backup reaction force (BRF) members through weapons 
training, both in port and underway. Additionally, sailors could train on the system 
in small groups of two to four. This would allow their departments to be more 
flexible in allowing team members to participate in training opportunities since 
they would not lose all of their VBSS team members at the same time. 
If the Navy wants to maintain the status quo of conducting MIO via 
embedded shipboard teams, it is highly recommended that more research be 
conducted on utilizing at least one of these two electronic training aids to 
supplement their training regimen. A combination of these two training aids could 
potentially provide the most efficient training to VBSS sailors with minimal impact 
on manning. Regardless, the fleet is currently lacking in VBSS training once the 
sailors complete the team trainer course. 
3. Summary 
Although more research is required to determine the overall effectiveness 
and implications of the recommendations, it is important to restate that the 
following resolutions may close the current capabilities gaps: 
1. Embarked units 
a. Increased capabilities 
i. Helicopter-borne insertions 
ii. Tactical questioning 
iii. Opportunity to include linguists 
b. More training opportunities 
i. VBSS won’t be a collateral duty 
ii. More follow on schools while in the Continental United 
States (CONUS) 
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c. Already in practice 
i. EOD 
ii. HVBSS (in small numbers) 
2. Deployable mission training 
a. Increased training opportunities 
i. Individual or team 
ii. Serious games can be loaded on any computer 
b. Already in practice (USMC and USA) 
i. VBS 2 
ii. ISMT-E 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Along with the recommendations that have already been made, future 
research is needed to continue the efforts in ensuring that the VBSS system is 
operating as efficiently and safely as possible. 
1. MIO Commander Training 
Though the research did not address this issue, the author learned 
through personal experience that the vessel operating as the MIO Commander 
for the strike group does not receive any training on the tasks/duties that are 
required of them. For the most part, it is obvious as to what they need to do, but 
given that the majority of current O-4s and higher do not have VBSS/MIO 
backgrounds, they rely heavily on their VBSS Boarding Officers. This is not 
always efficient and can pose problems. For example, if a ship is utilizing their 
BOs to rotate through the MIO Commander watch station, then who fills the 
position if a boarding requires the full team? Further research and development 
needs to be conducted to provide these ships with a viable training medium for 
not only training individuals to fill the MIO Commander watch station, but also to 
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provide the Department Heads, Executive Officer (XO), and Commanding Officer 
(CO) the proper guidance for operating as the MIO Commander throughout a 
deployment. 
2. Equipment 
Proper equipment is vital to the VBSS system. It can essentially save an 
individual’s life or limit their ability to perform as needed. It is essential that more 
research be conducted to enhance the equipment available to VBSS teams. 
As mentioned earlier, the focus group identified the issues that may exist 
with the current small boats in the Surface Navy’s inventory. These small boats 
not only provide the means for transporting the VBSS team members to the 
target vessel, but they also are utilized to transport detainees, rescue a man 
overboard, transfer personnel from one ship to another, and to complete many 
other tasks. The research needs to be conducted to determine if the current 
RHIBs that are being utilized are appropriate for the missions that require their 
use. This research needs to include, but not be limited to, issues of human 
factors, training, manpower, personnel, and cost. 
Another key area that needs to be investigated is the ballistic vest that the 
VBSS team members’ wear. These vests are supposed to provide ballistic 
protection, a flotation device, and the ability to carry essential equipment for 
completing their tasks. However, the ballistic plates that are in the current vests 
do not offer the same protection as those that are provided to the Marine Corps 
and U.S. Army (as indicated on the plates themselves). It would be beneficial to 
compare the current plates to the ESAPI ballistic plates that those two military 
services utilize. Why should sailors that are boarding a potentially hazardous 
vessel have equipment that is inferior to what the Department of Defense is 
currently purchasing? Additionally, the flotation device that the current vests 
utilize is a thick foam materiel. This bulky material slows the sailors down and 
hinders their movement through a vessel due to the increased circumference. It 
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would be beneficial to compare current flotation devices that are on the market to 
determine if there is an effective replacement to the current flotation material. 
3. Summary 
Over the last decade, MIO has become a primary mission for the U.S. 
Navy. For this reason, a concerted effort should be given to increase VBSS 
capabilities. Future research is needed to enhance the training and equipment 
that sailors receive upon graduating from the required schools. A trade-off 
analysis is strongly recommended to determine whether the Navy could facilitate 
shifting from embedded VBSS teams to embarked HVBSS teams. Improving 
VBSS proficiency is important to the future of the Navy’s MIO capabilities. 
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APPENDIX A. REQUEST FOR VOLUNTEERS (FOCUS GROUP) 
Fellow SWOs, 
 
As part of my thesis, I will be conducting a focus group discussion. The 
purpose of this focus group is to examine whether or not a capabilities gap 
currently exists within U.S. Navy shipboard Visit, Board, Search, Seizure (VBSS) 
teams. The focus group will require 5-10 SWOs, preferably with VBSS 
experience, to engage in approximately 20 minutes of conversation. Please 
respond if you can support my thesis and participate in the focus group, which 
will take place Thursday, 18 February, at 1200, location TBD. 
 
V/R 
Kevin Ray, LT, USN 
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APPENDIX B. INFORMED CONSENT (FOCUS GROUP) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Consent to Participate in Research 
 
Introduction. You are invited to participate in a research study to determine if a 
capabilities gap currently exists within the United States Navy’s Visit, Board, Search, 
Seizure (VBSS) shipboard assets. If it is determined that a capabilities gap does exist, the 
study will examine potential methods that the Navy could correct the deficiencies. 
 
Procedures. The focus group is being conducted in person in the Human Systems 
Integration Laboratory. It should take no more than 20 minutes. 
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study. Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. If you 
choose to participate you can change your mind at any time and withdraw from the study. 
You will not be penalized in any way or lose any benefits to which you would otherwise be 
entitled if you choose not to participate in this study or to withdraw.  
 
Potential Risks and Discomforts. The potential risks of participating in this study are 
inadvertent disclosure of individual focus group responses. To mitigate this risk, the 
project has implemented extensive data safeguarding procedures, a copy of which is 
available from the principle investigator, LT Kevin Ray. Yet, even with such procedures 
in place, there always remains some risk, however small, of a data breach. 
 
Anticipated Benefits. Anticipated benefits from this study are potentially increasing the 
effectiveness of U.S. Navy VBSS teams by identifying and examining solutions for current 
capabilities gaps. You may directly benefit from this study in future operations in which 
your ship may be involved. 
 
Compensation for Participation. No tangible compensation will be given. A copy of the 
research results will be available at the conclusion of the experiment via e-mail 
(kmray@nps.edu). 
Confidentiality & Privacy Act. Any information that is obtained during this study will be 
kept confidential to the full extent permitted by law. All efforts, within reason, will be 
made to keep your personal information in your research record confidential but total 
confidentiality cannot be guaranteed. Your participation in the focus group will not be 
disclosed. However, it is possible that the author may be required to divulge information 
obtained in the course of this research to the subject’s chain of command or other legal 
body.  
Points of Contact. If you have any questions or comments about the research, or you 
experience an injury or have questions about any discomforts that you experience while 
taking part in this study please contact the Principal Investigator, LT Kevin M. Ray, 656-
2786, kmray@nps.edu. Questions about your rights as a research subject or any other 
concerns may be addressed to the Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Angela 
O’Dea, 831-656-3966, alodea@nps.edu. 
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Statement of Consent. I have read the information provided above. I have been given 
the opportunity to ask questions and all the questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction. I have been provided a copy of this form for my records and I agree to 
participate in this study. I understand that by agreeing to participate in this research and 




________________________________________  __________________ 
Participant’s Signature     Date 
 
 
________________________________________  __________________ 
Author’s Signature     Date 
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APPENDIX C. INFORMED CONSENT (SURVEY) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Consent to Participate in Research 
 
Introduction. You are invited to participate in a research study to determine if a 
capabilities gap currently exists within the United States Navy’s Visit, Board, Search, 
Seizure (VBSS) shipboard assets. If it is determined that a capabilities gap does exist, the 
study will examine potential methods that the Navy could correct the deficiencies. 
 
Procedures. The survey is being conducted via the web. It should take no more than 15 
minutes to complete. 
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study. Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. If you 
choose to participate you can change your mind at any time and withdraw from the study. 
You will not be penalized in any way or lose any benefits to which you would otherwise be 
entitled if you choose not to participate in this study or to withdraw.  
 
Potential Risks and Discomforts. The potential risks of participating in this study are 
inadvertent disclosure of individual survey responses. To mitigate this risk, the project 
has implemented extensive data safeguarding procedures, a copy of which is available 
from the principle investigator, LT Kevin Ray. Yet, even with such procedures in place, 
there always remains some risk, however small, of a data breach. 
 
Anticipated Benefits. Anticipated benefits from this study are potentially increasing the 
effectiveness of U.S. Navy VBSS teams by identifying and examining solutions for current 
capabilities gaps. You may directly benefit from this study in future operations in which 
your ship may be involved. 
 
Compensation for Participation. No tangible compensation will be given. A copy of the 
research results will be available at the conclusion of the experiment via e-mail 
(kmray@nps.edu). 
Confidentiality & Privacy Act. Any information that is obtained during this study will be 
kept confidential to the full extent permitted by law. All efforts, within reason, will be 
made to keep your personal information in your research record confidential but total 
confidentiality cannot be guaranteed. Your participation in the survey and your individual 
responses to the survey will not be disclosed. However, it is possible that the author may 
be required to divulge information obtained in the course of this research to the subject’s 
chain of command or other legal body.  
Points of Contact. If you have any questions or comments about the research, or you 
experience an injury or have questions about any discomforts that you experience while 
taking part in this study please contact the Principal Investigator, LT Kevin M. Ray, 656-
2786, kmray@nps.edu. Questions about your rights as a research subject or any other 
concerns may be addressed to the Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Angela 
O’Dea, 831-656-3966, alodea@nps.edu. 
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Statement of Consent. I have read the information provided above. I have been given 
the opportunity to ask questions and all the questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction. I have been provided a copy of this form for my records and I agree to 
participate in this study. I understand that by agreeing to participate in this research and 
signing this form, I do not waive any of my legal rights. 
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APPENDIX D. SURVEY QUESTIONS 
1. Did your ships manning levels have an effect on VBSS? 




a. What was the impact that manning had on VBSS training opportunities? 
 Negative affect 
No affect 
Positive affect 
b. What impact did manning have on actual VBSS operations? 




2. Does your VBSS team PT together? 
  No 
  In port only 
  Underway only 
  Both in port and underway 
 
3. How often does your ships’ VBSS team train while in port (not including PT)? 
 Less than once a Week 
 Once a Week 
 Twice a Week 
 More than Twice a Week 
 
4. How often does your ships’ VBSS team train while underway (not including 
PT)? 
 Less than once a Week 
 Once a Week 
 Twice a Week 
 More than Twice a Week 
 
5. Does the amount of training differ between the work up cycle and actual 
deployment? 
  No, we train the same 
  We train more often during work-ups 
  We train more often during deployment 
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6. Are the underway watchbills set up to allow you to participate in training on a 
regular basis? 
  No 
  Sometimes 
  Yes 
 
7. Are the underway watchbills set up to allow you to participate in actual 
operations on a regular basis? 
  No 
  Sometimes 
  Yes 
 
8. On average, does your command give you an opportunity to get at least 6 
hours of sleep prior to actual VBSS operations? 
  No 
  Yes 
 
9. Have you made a deployment as part of your ship’s VBSS team? 
  No 
  Yes 
 
10. During your last deployment, in how many months did your VBSS team 
conduct actual operations? 
  0 
  1-2 
  3 or more 
 
11. In your opinion, were you fully prepared for the following VBSS related 
operations? 
 Boardings 
  Not prepared at all 
Not quite prepared 
  Prepared fairly well 
  Very well prepared 
 Approach, Assist, Visits (AAVs) 
  Not prepared at all 
Not quite prepared 
  Prepared fairly well 
  Very well prepared 
 Detainee Handling 
  Not prepared at all 
Not quite prepared 
  Prepared fairly well 
  Very well prepared 
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If you answered ‘no’ or ‘somewhat’ to any of the above questions: 
 How were you not prepared (select all that apply)? 
  Training pipeline was not sufficient 
  Shipboard training was not/is not sufficient 
  Other (please explain) 
 
12. Are there any other comments regarding your experiences with VBSS that 
are not previously addressed with this survey? 
 
13. What is your rank? 
 
14. What is your rate? 
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APPENDIX E. LETTER TO COMMANDING OFFICERS 
Sir, 
I am a fellow Surface Warfare Officer currently stationed at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. I am currently one year into my curriculum and have 
started working on my thesis. The goal of the thesis is to identify a possible 
capabilities gap within VBSS and, if needed, to propose solutions to close the 
gap. With your approval, I would like to provide each of your qualified VBSS 
Team Members with a short survey/questionnaire to gather data on this 
important issue. 
The survey will consist of approximately 20 questions and will be focused 
on the following objectives: 
 
a. Determine if there is a Capabilities GAP in VBSS Training 
 i. Is the GAP during the training pipeline? 
 ii. Is the GAP after the training pipeline? 
  1. In-port 
  2. Underway 
b. How often does your team train? 
 i. In-port 
 ii. Underway 
  1. Training Cycle 
  2. Deployed 
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c. Does the command support VBSS? 
 i. In-port 
  1. Training 
  2. PT 
 ii. Underway 
  1. Training 
  2. Watchbills 
  3. PT 
  4. Sleep (night prior to boardings) 
d. Do your ships manning levels affect VBSS? 
 i. VBSS training 
 ii. VBSS operations 
 
Although the survey will be asking questions about command support, the 
survey will be kept confidential and the names of the participants and their ships 
will remain anonymous. The purpose of the survey is to identify common issues 
across the Navy in order to develop a solution that can improve the capabilities, 
and overall safety, of our boarding teams. 
Additionally, I am looking at comparing the results between “optimally” 
manned vessels and vessels with regular manning. If you approve of your VBSS 
team participating in the survey, can you also inform me if your vessel is 
considered “optimally” manned? I will be pleased to provide a copy of my 
completed thesis to you, at your request. Thank you for your time, assistance, 
and consideration. 
V/R 
Kevin Ray, LT, USN 
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APPENDIX F. REQUEST FOR VOLUNTEERS (SURVEY) 
VBSS Team Member,  
 
You have been selected to participate in a voluntary study about 
improving VBSS capabilities and training. The purpose of this study is to 
determine VBSS training capability gaps and to propose solutions for closing 
these gaps. This short survey consists of approximately 20 questions and should 
not take more than 15 minutes of your time. Please click here (SurveyMonkey 
link) to participate. 
 
V/R  
Kevin Ray, LT, USN 
 
If you are not a qualified VBSS Team Member, please click here (opt-out link). 
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APPENDIX G. RESPONSES TO THE SURVEY OPEN ENDED 
QUESTIONS 
Reply 
Number Question # 15 - Other (please specify) 
1 
The VBSS school house (and to a lesser extent, the Unit-
Level training schedule) is good training for large vessels 
and actual boardings.  However, we are given little, if 
any, formal training in AAV and other kind of nonMIO 
boardings (CNT, Counter-Piracy, etc.).  This has to 
essentially be invented by the ship's team members. 
2 
VBSS not a priority on my ship. Little to no support to 
chain of command. 
3 
The schoolhouse taught me all about noncompliant 
boardings, but nothing about how to approach a 
fisherman and build rapport. 
4 
not enough emphasis on training and maintaining skills 
already attained. 
5 
ship's manning does not allow for consistent training 
while inport or underway. 
6 
VBSS pipeline was descent but some techniques have 
changed and shipboard training/ techniques vary. 
7 
Being on a boat out of Hawaii we get deployed a lot.  So 
when we are in port or out VBSS training always gets 
pushed off.  Its like Captains think that we will never 
have to use the skill we learned and we should train for 
real events such as GQ's and ATFP.  Then while we are 
in port we are always preping for some kind of cert.  I 
see it as a joke for the Navy, no one takes it seriously.  
Its always something that "wont ever happen" but when 
it does and something goes wrong everyone is going to 





Number Question # 16 - Response Text 
1 
Our last deployment was exclusively focused on Counter-Piracy, 
boarding only extremely small vessels (skiffs, dhows and fishing boats).  
From my knowledge of other ship's deployments, their experiences are 




The training pipeline, however, seems to focus exclusively on boarding 




In terms of manning, the collateral nature of the team makes it difficult 
to accomplish some tasks - everyone on the team works for the VBSS 
team only indirectly, so the priority is usually on whatever that person's 
real job is, vice the VBSS team. 
2 
Training cycles prove to be useful.  The only down side is most 
evaluation teams, whether ATG or someone else are very inconsistant 
with grading criteria.  Everyone needs to be on the same page to make 
sure everyone is executing operations as required. 
3 N/A 
4 
VBSS encompasses a wide variety of operations, including AAVs, FVVs, 
approaches, visits, boardings and more.  The school house focused only 
on the worst case scenario, and kept everything and everybody at a 
ramped up level.  I have conducted over 150 AAV/Boardings in my last 
two deployments, and have yet to need a pistol.  That being said, the 
NCB training is definitely necessary, but more rapport building and 
better searching procedures needs to be covered.  I suggest a cross-
service training opportunity with either NEIC out of VA, or the Coast 
Guard LEDET guys in between deployments in SSE/TSE. 
5 
Training is a big challenge for VBSS teams onboard.  The ships training 
cycle and optempo have made it difficult to get all team members 
together at one time to conduct training. 
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6 
The process prior to boarding a suspect vessel (obtaining permission 
from whoever it may be in charge of overall operations.) takes entirely 
to long and is in fact hendering the teams abilitly to conduct a swift and 
smooth boarding. for example: the team is usual dressed out and ready 
to board the RHIB within 12 minutes of being called away. however, it 
sometimes would take over 45 min to an 1.5 hours for the "ok" to 
board order to come down. which gave the suspected vessel time to get 
away or dispose of any illegal materials they may have......... how is 
this effective? 
7 
With how manning is right now on this Platform. There is barely enough 
time to train and work out as a team because everyone is so busy 
doing there in rate jobs. Allot of times we are being pulled to do FSA, 
Flight Deck, SCAT and other duties that require time away from VBSS. 
Setting time aside becomes secondary to what really counts and that is 
to keep our proficiency and motivation as high as possible.  There is not 
enough time in the day to complete everything that is required of us. 
Needless to say I am burned out and just want someone that counts 
numbers to understand we need additional personnel on active duty to 
complete all of our missions safely. But that want happen because the 
money is not there to enlist more personnel. So here we are suffering. 
Time is now to act. 
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8 
My command NEIC has teams that are dedicated assets to Navy VBSS.  
Our primary mission is to forward deploy to ships integrate with their 
VBSS teams and operate with them while they are deployed.  With that 
being said I have been attached to more than 30 platforms and 
conducted more than 300 VBSS operations since 2006.  I also spend 
time while in ports assisting CSFTL assessing VBSS teams.  In all my 
time doing this I see some of the same issues that plague most teams.  
Senior level leadership and involvement from the Chiefs and first class 
mess’s.  This effects the amount of training that is provided, if it is 
supported and divisions require their team to attend.    Not enough 
emphasis put on VBSS training except for right before fleet level 
exercises.  This is not all teams but a majority.  Few teams PT together 
and conduct training on a constant basis, those teams stand out leaps 
above the other teams.  There is also a huge difference in the teams 
that members with multiple deployments in the leadership roles such as 
a second tour BO or senior enlisted.     Biggest issue is teams are 
trained on worst case scenario in the school house.  I could not even 
begin to make up the numbers for the amount of VBSS operations that 
have been conducted over the past 10 years but I am sure it is well 
less than a tenth of a percent that have been hostile in nature.  Of 
those most were hostile during the approach phase of the operation.  
The Navy does not arm our VBSS teams with the knowledge of cultural 
sensitivities, rapport building and collection of information.  These are 
all areas in which my command tries to help by providing training on 
those topics while onboard ships operating with their teams.  This is a 
noticeable gap in training and what is provided by my command helps 
fill the gap for the ships that we deploy to but leaves a lot of ships with 
this huge gap in what is the most important part of our job showing the 
US Navy and it’s coalition partners care about the people and build 
partnership and trust amongst the maritime community. 
9 
I think pt standards should be raised to a higher standard for the 
teams. i think thier should be more time alloted for the team to train. 
10 
LPD 18 is so undermanned, it is almost impossible for engineers to 
make all training evolutions or be off the watchbill while deployed in 5th 
fleet area 
11 
Being on a ship with as high of an optempo as this one is a challenge 
when it comes to VBSS training.  It's very difficult to get your entire 
team together for training, even for only 2 hours every week.  There 
are always multiple team members on watch or taking part in another 
mandatory meeting or evolution.  Our training on the last deployment 
was limited specifically because of this. 
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12 
Just wanted to say that my answers were biased. I am, for roster 
reason, a part of the NC/VBSS team. However, I haven't been an 
integral part of the team for around 2 to 2 1/2 years.I vollunteered with 
specific people for specific reason. Once those personnel moved on, the 
team (not the current outfit) took a turn that I didn't want to be 
associated with.The VBSS operations I asnwered to were conducted 2-3 
years ago. Entire teams were still standing watch and coming off of the 
rev (0200-0700) watch, holiday routines were few and far between for 
team members, and dinners were always cold. If you asked any one of 
those members, though, if they'd go back to that team and deal with all 
the short comings of the job again, they'd answer yes. Without a 
doubt.Op-Tempo increase blows, but the crew will always manage to 
get behind one another and complete a task. Any task. 
13 
When conducting 7th fleet operations we rarely train, if at all, 
underway.  If conducting 5th fleet operations, a much larger emphasis 
is placed on VBSS proficiency.   
 
I also feel that VBSS should be a primary duty, or rate and not a 
collateral duty.  To pull sailors that primarily deal with maintaining 
extremely expensive combat systems and engineering equipment, and 
then ask them to instantly switch mindsets to go board a suspect vessel 
is near reckless.  This practice yields sailors that are mediocre 
technicians and mediocre boarding team members, and puts lives at 
risk on the RHIB, on the vessel, and the ship. 
14 
VBSS operations would drastically improve if ships were required to 
send their VBSS personnel to refresher schools at least once a year. 
This would allow the teams to learn to work together and get valuable 
advice from VBSS trainers on how to train on the ship. In addition, 
Commanding Officers should be required to have their VBSS teams PT 
together. Standard physical training with the command will not suffice 
for VBSS members; due to the nature of the job a higher intensity 
training program should be implemented. CENSECFOR VBSS instructors 
should be evaluating the ships for Ultra Sand all VBSS certifications. 
Most ATG members are not efficient in tactics themselves; therefore 
they are not capable of evaluating the teams efficiently. 
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15 
I would like to see more refresher classes done with qualified 
instructors to make sure that boarding teams are keeping up 
proficiency. A push to the CO's and XO's of all commands the 
importance of VBSS training to keep the teams sharp and aware of 
everything that goes on durring a boarding. 
16 
VBSS is an awesome capability, however the amount of regular training 
coupled with out comittments to the ship outside of the VBSS mission 
make it difficult for the ship's watchbill and manning.  Generally, we are 
taken off the watchbill during VBSS operations which could put other 
watchstations in port and starboard for extended periods of time. The 
alternative would be to send VBSS detachments to ships, making some 
things more effecient/effective - but those benefits would be moderated 
by the lack of integration between the ship and the detachment. End 
result, VBSS training and operations need to reflected in ship's manning 
levels. 
17 
ships do not provide adequate funding for materials.  VBSS is a serious 
mission that has a very high potential for mishaps, but it is not treated 
that way by the chain of command.  AEL's are also not updated by 
shore side for up to date items that should be held during reviews and 
spot checks of equipment. 
18 
We train everyday for events that most people in the Navy will never 
see, why do we train so little for people who are risking their life going 
to another boat and maybe earning an extra $150 a month. 
19 
The initial team trainer school should be longer. I felt three weeks was 
too short. 
20 
Maybe it's just this ship but, we need to train better than what we do 
now.  Our team is brand new now and we have not work together 
before.  I feel really uncomfortable working with this team because I 
have not trained with them and we are not as one.  I just don't have 
the trust in this new team to do a boarding because of lack of training.  
we need to train no just for inspection but for real life. 
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